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STARDOM AND THE PROFITABILITY OF FILM 
MAKING:  WARNER BROS. IN THE 1930s 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
This paper examines the film production performance of Warner Bros. during the 1930s, 
placing particular emphasis on the manner in which Warners invested in stars. Warners are 
shown to have acted rationally in the sense of having consistently invested in previously 
successful actors. An assessment is then made of how successful such a strategy proved to be.  
Drawing a distinction between high and medium/low budget production, the deployment of 
established stars in high budget productions did not appear to have constituted a successful 
strategy. The production of medium/low budget films, by contrast, provided a more stable 
environment, in which there were clear returns to the deployment of previously successful 
actors. 
 
Key Words:  Film industry; Stardom; Risk; Portfolio theory 
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STARDOM AND THE PROFITABILITY OF FILM MAKING: 
WARNER BROS. IN THE 1930s 
 
 
The film industry provides a rich focus for applied economic analysis.  The industry is a 
complex one, in terms of the nature of the product it produces, the variety of ways in which 
the product is distributed, and the evolving and innovative mechanisms that are used to 
maximise product revenue.  The popular perception of the industry is one in which a high 
level of risk is inherent to the production process, but an industry none the less that can 
provide substantial rewards for the successful risk-taker.  Indeed the industry actively 
encourages such a perception, together with the perception that the production process is akin 
to alchemy, in that it is incapable of precise specification.  
 
In attempting to separate fact from fiction the economist is immediately faced with data 
problems.  Superficially, a wealth of data is readily available, particularly data relating to the 
revenues generated by films, on a week by week and film by film basis.1 Indeed the industry 
itself appears to believe that box-office revenue is the sole barometer of film success, 
although the cynic might argue that this is just a further example of the industry attempting to 
deflect detailed scrutiny of its performance.  However on the cost side, only very limited data 
is available, thus precluding any detailed analysis of profitability.  Production cost data (or 
‘negative costs’ in industry parlance) are available, but these are only estimates, although 
industry sources are confident that these are measured to within 10 percent accuracy.2  
However, no data are available on distribution/promotion costs, and consequently identifying 
the profits generated by a film to any acceptable level of accuracy is a fraught business. This 
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is certainly an issue that fuels considerable speculation, and there is a commonly held view 
amongst industry insiders that only 30 percent of films produced in Hollywood today 
generate profits.3 
 
Given the environment of risk that surrounds film production, and the manner in which this 
impacts upon film profitability, the rational film producer will seek to adopt a variety of 
strategies to attenuate risk.  Prominent amongst these is the manner in which stars are 
developed and deployed across film products. Stars, it is argued widely, serve to attenuate the 
risks associated with film production by locating new products in aesthetic and pleasure 
domains already familiar to audiences. Steven Albert (1998, p. 251), for instance, argues that 
‘stars are important because they are the least noisy and most consistent marker for successful 
film types.’ Tino Balio  (1995, p. 144) goes so far as to claim that ‘stars create(d) the market 
value of motion pictures.’ 
 
The importance attached to the notion of the ‘movie star’ has a long history in the industry, 
and is almost as old as the industry itself.  Indeed the transformation of the industry from the 
studio-based structure of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s to the freelance structure of today can 
be attributed in part to stars exploiting their growing market power. There was strong 
pressure exerted by stars to break free from the constraints placed upon them by the tightly 
specified, long-term contracts of the studio era, thereby allowing them to capture, through net 
profit contracts, the economic rents associated with their success.4 
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This paper presents an analysis of the film making activities of Warner Bros. during the 
1930s. The analysis places a particular emphasis on assessing the impact that stars had on 
profitability, and the extent to which the development and deployment of stars proved to be 
an effective risk-minimising strategy. The relevance of this historical analysis can be justified 
as follows.  First, the period of analysis can be interpreted as one in which the star system 
reached maturity and that a direct lineage can be traced between the role of the star at that 
time and today. Second, the economic volatility of the 1930s provides an environment in 
which risk was an important, and indeed dominating, characteristic. Third, the tightly 
controlled structure of the studio system provides a stable institutional context for a detailed 
examination of various risk-minimising strategies.  Finally, a comprehensive data set is 
available, consisting of production cost data that are derived directly from studio records.5 
We treat the studios as profit maximising firms that make a product from a combination of 
physical and human capital, much of which is artistic in nature, with the express purpose of 
generating a return on capital over and above normal profits. Stars are thus an input in a 
production function and constitute a major component in a firm’s cost function. In the 
manner set down by Klein and Leffler (1981) we envisage that the production company and 
the star are engaged in a game in which each adopts wealth maximising strategies. 
 
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: In the next section a brief literature 
review is presented.  There then follows a discussion of the risk environment that Warners 
faced during the 1930s. An analysis of the manner in which Warners developed and deployed 
their actors forms the next section, with a similar analysis then presented with regard to the 
deployment of directors and the genre composition of annual film portfolios, as alternative 
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risk attenuating mechanisms. A final section presents an assessment of the success of these 
risk-controlling strategies, and in particular, the implications that these had for profitability. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A number of studies have been published recently that have attempted to evaluate the precise 
impact that stars have on the success of film production.  De Vany and Walls (1999), using a 
sample of over 2,000 films produced between 1984 and 1996, suggest that a strategy of using 
high profile stars has limited and very uncertain returns. Thus while there is evidence that a 
very small number of stars can have a positive impact on profitability, this is not the norm. 
They conclude that given the extent to which film production is dominated by risk there 
would appear to be no single strategy that can be adopted by film producers to control this 
risk, least of all the extensive use of stars.   Indeed they write, ‘We conclude that the studio 
model of risk management lacks a foundation in theory or evidence. Revenue forecasts have 
zero precision, which is just a formal way of saying that ‘anything can happen.’’ (1999:286).  
Ravid (1999), using a smaller sample, but a more extensive set of independent variables, 
reaches a similar conclusion.  Albert (1998), on the other hand, while also concluding that it 
is only a small handful of stars that can be identified as being successful, argues that these 
stars none the less can be seen as being consistently successful, and therefore do represent the 
focus for a coherent risk-minimising strategy. This is consistent with Rosen’s concept of 
‘superstardom’ where the combination of rising incomes and the widespread diffusion of 
technical progress is sufficient to generate an ever growing consumer demand for quality, 
leading to ‘the marked concentration of output on those few sellers who have the most talent’ 
(1981: 847). Rosen, like Hamlen (1991, 1994), treats talent as an objective entity consisting 
of unique but measurable inputs that are not readily substitutable. Adler (1985), however, 
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maintains that no difference in talent need be involved between stars and non-stars, hence 
drawing attention to the function of stars in lowering audience search costs.  However, in 
contrast to De Vany and Walls and Ravid, Albert worked only with box-office revenues 
rather than profits, which may explain, in part, his more positive conclusions (see Sedgwick 
and Pokorny (1999) and Albert (1999)). 
 
In terms of historical studies of stardom these have tended to place less emphasis on detailed 
quantitative analyses, and have emphasised the broader context within which the star system 
operated. Thus stars could be interpreted as having been used to raise the profile of the 
industry as a whole and to maintain and extend this profile in the marketplace. As Kerr (1990, 
p. 387) argues when explaining how Adolph Zukor and others reshaped the American film 
industry between 1912 and 1916: 
 
His product was the film star who became simultaneously a focal point for the 
construction of narratives within the film and for management coordination 
throughout the industry. The new star formed a synergistic link between film 
as an aesthetic form and as a product of corporate industry.  
 
One difficulty with studies that focus on profitability, or success, on a film by film basis, such 
as the studies by De Vany and Walls (1996, 1999), Ravid (1999) and Albert (1998), is that no 
attempt is made to identify and evaluate strategies that are adopted by studios or film 
producers across their portfolio of films.  That is, in the course of a year, say, a producer or 
studio will produce a number of films, associated with each of which will be a perceived 
level of risk.  The objective of the producer will be to maximise the return over this entire 
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portfolio of films, and the budgets allocated to each film will be determined with reference to 
the distribution of risks across these films.  That is, to judge a single film purely in terms of 
the profits it generates is to assess this film outside of the context within which its budgetary 
allocation was made.  These ideas are developed more fully in Sedgwick and Pokorny (1998). 
 
This paper attempts to evaluate stardom as a strategy, but places an emphasis on a portfolio 
interpretation. That is, it places the discussion within the context of the theory of the firm and 
takes as its point of contention the argument quoted earlier from De Vany and Walls that no 
sensible risk averting strategy is available to film producers.  The historical context allows for 
a deeper understanding of the business strategies employed during the period when 
Hollywood had evolved into a well-established and modern industry. 
 
THE RISK ENVIRONMENT OF FILM MAKING DURING THE 1930s 
Although only established as a film producer in 1921, Warners was by 1930 one of the big 
five vertically integrated players in what is considered generally as a mature oligopoly - the 
others being MGM/Loews, Paramount, Fox (20th Century Fox from 1935), and RKO (see 
Balio (1995)). During the period 1931/32 to 1938/39 Warners released 441 films for general 
distribution, an average of 55 films each year, with a minimum of 52 films in 1931/32 and a 
maximum of 58 films in both 1935/36 and 1936/37.  Annual production budgets ranged from 
$15.4 million in 1932/33 to $28.1 million in 1937/38 (all expressed in 1929 prices).  
 
A general understanding of the nature of the risk environment of film production during the 
1930s can be derived from scattergraphs of the box-office revenues and rates of return against 
film production costs, generated by each of the 441 films Warners produced over the period 
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(all monetary aggregates are expressed in 1929 prices). The data are derived from the 
William Schaefer ledger of production costs and box-office revenues of feature films released 
by Warners between 1922 and 1951. However, a weakness of the data set is the absence of 
information on distribution costs, thereby precluding the derivation of the net profits 
associated with each film and hence film rates of return.  The approach taken by Sedgwick 
and Pokorny (1998) was to make reference to a parallel data set on the films released by 
RKO over the same period (see Jewell (1994)), which contained data on film profits, thereby 
allowing the derivation of distribution costs.  These data exhibited a clear and strong 
correlation between distribution costs and box-office revenues of 0.97, with distribution costs 
representing 37% of revenues, on average.  This ratio was applied to the Warners’ revenue 
data, allowing for the estimation of distribution costs, and hence net profits and rates of 
return. 
 
However, in order to avoid this estimation approach, a somewhat different approach will be 
taken here.  Let iC  denote the production cost (negative cost) of film i, iR  the box-office 
revenues generated by film i, iD  the distribution costs associated with film i and iP  the net 
profits generated by film i, where iP  is defined as iii DCR −− .  Consider as a film rate of 
return measure the ratio of net profits to production costs, that is: 
 
 
i
iii
i C
DCR
RR
−−=         (1) 
 
Thus note that this is not a strict rate of return measure, as the denominator consists of only 
one component of total costs - production costs.  However, the argument here is that in 
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judging the success of a film reference will be made to the profits generated by the film 
relative to its production costs, the component of total costs which is the focus of decision 
making by the producer.  Distribution costs are largely out of the producer’s control, evolving 
over time in response to the film’s success.  In the simplest cases of distribution costs either 
being directly proportional to box-office revenues, such that ii RD α= , or distribution costs 
being determined initially as a fixed proportion of production costs, and thereafter evolving in 
direct proportion to revenues, such that iii RCD γβ += , then Equation (1) collapses to: 
 
 δλ −=
i
i
i C
R
RR         (2) 
 
which will be perfectly correlated with the simple ratio of box-office revenues to production 
costs.   
 
If distribution costs consist of a strict fixed cost component, such that: 
 
 iii RCD γβα ++=        (3) 
 
then substitution into Equation (1) will produce an expression that while not perfectly 
correlated with the ratio of revenues to production costs, will still be highly correlated with it,  
provided that α  is relatively small.   
 
Consequently the main performance measure used in the remainder of this paper will be the 
ratio of box-office revenues to production costs, on the assumption that this measure is highly 
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correlated with the rate of return measure defined in Equation (1). We will denote this 
measure by RC .   As a final justification for the use of this measure we can consider a 
comparable data set on all the films produced by MGM and RKO over the same period, in 
which actual profit and hence distribution cost data are available.6  In total these two data sets 
contained 670 films, for each of which the ratio of box-office revenues to costs was derived 
( iRC ) and the ratio of profits to production costs was also derived ( iRR ).  The correlation 
between these two measures, across all 670 films, was 0.992, providing a very strong 
justification for interpreting iRC  as directly reflecting film rates of return, and hence for 
using iRC  for the Warners’ data as a rate of return measure. 
 
Figure 1 presents a scattergraph of box-office revenues against film production costs, and 
Figure 2 presents a scatter of iRC  also against film production costs, for each of the 441 
films Warners produced over the period (all monetary aggregates are expressed in 1929 
prices). From Figure 1 it can be seen that revenues increased with production costs, but with 
increasing variability.  Figure 2 exhibits a broadly negative (and non-linear) association 
between rates of return and production budgets. In particular, there was a tendency for low to 
medium budget films to generate very high RC values, but for high budget films to generate 
relatively low RCs. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 are also useful for emphasising how misleading it can be to rely on box-
office revenues alone as a measure of film success. High box-office revenues did not 
necessarily imply high RCs, and indeed some high revenue earning films actually produced 
losses.  This can be illustrated by considering the two most expensive films that Warners 
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produced over the period - The Adventures of Robin Hood, produced at a cost of $2.5million, 
and Juarez which cost $1.8million.  The Adventures of Robin Hood was Warners’ highest 
grossing film of the entire period, generating revenues of $4.8million, and hence an RC  
value of 1.9, sufficient presumably for the film to produce a net profit, but not a particularly 
outstanding one in rate of return terms. In the case of Juarez, although the box-office revenue 
at $2 million was relatively high, the high production costs resulted in a poor RC  value of 
1.1, which would have been insufficient to have generated a positive net profit.  In other 
words, while box-office revenue can be interpreted as a direct reflection of film popularity, it 
does not follow that a popular film, in an absolute sense, is necessarily a profitable one, 
emphasising the sensitive relationship between production costs, revenues and profitability. 
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Sedgwick and Pokorny (1998) interpreted the setting of annual budgets as a two-stage 
process.  First the global budget was set, and this appeared to be set essentially in response to 
the aggregate rate of return performance of the previous year’s budget - high aggregate rate 
of return performance would stimulate an expansion in the budget, whereas low rate of return 
performance would result in a contraction of the budget.  Once the global budget was set, a 
decision had to be taken as to the number of low budget, medium budget and high budget 
films that were to be produced. The approach taken was to interpret this process in terms of 
portfolio theory.  Thus while there were greater risks associated with high budget production, 
it was higher budget films that were capable of generating high profits, thereby making a 
significant contribution to the annual profit target.  Conversely, low budget production, while 
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being less risky, in the sense of being less likely to generate losses, could only generate 
limited profits. 
 
It is therefore important to recognise the constrained nature of annual film production.  Given 
an annual production budget, determined by the corporation’s East Coast office’s assessment 
of its in-house exhibition requirements, the studio was charged with producing a balance of 
films that would sustain its in-house cinemas. A strategy of low to medium budget production 
only would make Warners dependent on acquiring principal attractions from rival studios and 
therefore vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour.  In addition such a strategy would result in 
an under-spend on its annual production budget, given the limitations on the outlets for low 
to medium budget films.  In producing its own big budget films the studio privileged its in-
house exhibition wing with a set of films which would draw audiences away from cinemas 
owned by rival corporations or, better still, be sufficiently popular with audiences to play on 
rival screens for a rent.7 However, as can be seen from Figures 1 and 2, making a principal 
attraction was not simply a matter of producing expensive films with high presentation 
standards. The process can best be interpreted as one of maximising the rate of return on the 
global budget, subject to an output constraint, an inverse relationship between production 
budgets and rates of return, and an aggregate production budget allocated by the East Coast 
office. In other words, it was perfectly rational and consistent to produce high budget films, 
which generated low and highly variable rates of return, while at the same time maximising 
the rate of return on the aggregate production budget - a number of high budget films had to 
be produced in order to absorb the annual budget.  The key was getting the balance right 
between low, medium and high budget production, given the nature of the production 
constraints, and the distribution of risk across budgetary categories. 
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THE ALLOCATION OF WARNERS’ ANNUAL FILM BUDGET BY ACTOR 
In order to gain some insight into the manner in which Warners deployed their stars in the 
1930s, Table 1 presents a set of statistical summaries, for those actors who appeared in films 
which in aggregate accounted for more than 2.5 percent of total production budgets over the 
sample period.8 A first observation which can be made from the table is how intensively 
many of these actors were worked during the period, with Blondell, Brent, Davis, Farrell and 
O’Brien appearing in over 30 productions for the studio, with another five featuring in more 
than 25. In terms of the share of production costs the leading actors were Powell (Dick), 
Brent, Davis, O’Brien, de Havilland and Blondell.  In the cases of Blondell, Brent, Davis and 
O’Brien this relatively large share of production costs derived from frequent appearances in 
medium budget films, whereas in the case of de Havilland the large share derived from 
relatively few appearances in very high budget films.  Powell’s large share derived from 
relatively frequent appearances in higher budget films, particularly musicals.  However, in 
terms of RCs, these was relatively poor for those films in which Brent, de Havilland and 
Powell appeared.  The highest RCs were generated by films in which Cagney, MacMahon, 
Keeler, Kibbee, Bogart and Lindsay appeared.  The real stars for the studio during these years 
were those artists whom they entrusted to carry their super ‘A’ productions: a list that 
narrows down to Rains, de Havilland, Flynn, Keeler, and Powell during the early years, Muni 
during the later years and Davis in the last year of the period (see discussion of Table 2 
below). 
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TABLE 1 
 
Summary Statistics of Film Appearances by Actor 
1931/32 to 1938/39 
1929 Prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actor 
 
 
 
 
 
Number 
of Films 
 
 
 
Average 
Production 
Cost per 
Film  
($=000) 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
of Production 
Costs 
(%) 
 
 
Share of Total 
Production 
Costs of Films 
in which Actor 
Appeared 
(%) 
 
Ratio of 
Sum of  
Revenues 
to Sum of 
Production 
Costs  
(RC) 
 
 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation 
of Film 
RCs 
(%) 
 
Astor, M 
 
15 
 
288.7 
 
60.8 
 
2.7 
 
2.1 
 
26.0 
 
Blondell, J 
 
35 
 
403.2 
 
54.8 
 
8.7 
 
2.4 
 
44.8 
 
Bogart, H 
 
20 
 
432.4 
 
46.2 
 
5.3 
 
2.5 
 
44.7 
 
Brent, G 
 
32 
 
465.5 
 
71.8 
 
9.1 
 
1.9 
 
39.1 
 
Brown, J E 
 
13 
 
348.6 
 
20.6 
 
2.8 
 
2.3 
 
13.6 
 
Cagney, J 
 
22 
 
486.0 
 
58.8 
 
6.6 
 
3.0 
 
45.2 
 
Davis, B  
 
33 
 
444.2 
 
82.1 
 
9.0 
 
2.3 
 
35.8 
 
de Havilland, O 
 
14 
 
1042.1 
 
55.8 
 
8.9 
 
1.9 
 
58.4 
 
Dvorak, A 
 
20 
 
262.5 
 
46.5 
 
3.2 
 
2.4 
 
49.8 
 
Farrell, G 
 
37 
 
256.0 
 
68.2 
 
5.8 
 
2.4 
 
39.4 
 
Flynn, E 
 
12 
 
989.2 
 
35.7 
 
7.3 
 
2.3 
 
33.9 
 
Foran, D 
 
20 
 
226.1 
 
93.7 
 
2.8 
 
2.0 
 
24.2 
 
Francis, K 
 
28 
 
421.7 
 
39.9 
 
7.2 
 
2.0 
 
36.0 
 
Keeler, R 
 
8 
 
734.7 
 
22.2 
 
3.6 
 
2.6 
 
46.5 
 
Kibbee, G 
 
26 
 
285.2 
 
67.1 
 
4.5 
 
2.5 
 
50.0 
 
Lindsay, M 
 
28 
 
354.7 
 
77.0 
 
6.1 
 
2.5 
 
40.6 
 
Louise, A 
 
11 
 
604.5 
 
64.8 
 
4.1 
 
1.8 
 
48.7 
 
MacMahon, A 
 
18 
 
292.2 
 
42.3 
 
3.2 
 
2.6 
 
63.3 
 
Muni, P 
 
8 
 
598.8 
 
85.4 
 
2.9 
 
2.2 
 
61.7 
 
O’Brien, P 
 
31 
 
472.3 
 
44.6 
 
9.0 
 
2.2 
 
52.3 
 
Powell, D 
 
26 
 
698.3 
 
46.0 
 
11.1 
 
1.9 
 
50.3 
 
Rains, C 
 
11 
 
1123.0 
 
56.2 
 
7.6 
 
1.6 
 
35.3 
 
Robinson, EG 
 
14 
 
454.0 
 
33.7 
 
3.9 
 
2.4 
 
24.2 
 
Sheridan, A 
 
16 
 
352.1 
 
83.8 
 
3.5 
 
2.1 
 
27.8  
William, W 
 
28 
 
271.0 
 
41.7 
 
4.7 
 
2.2 
 
55.0  
Source: William Schaefer Ledger 
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Of further note from Table 1 is that Rains appeared in the highest budget films, but achieved 
the lowest RC.  Similarly, Louise also appeared in relatively high budget films, but these 
achieved a low overall RC.  Conversely, both Flynn and Keeler appeared in high budget, RC 
films, although in the case of Keeler there was considerable variability in the RCs of the films 
in which she appeared reflecting her declining appeal after 1934.  The films in which Brown 
appeared achieved relatively high but remarkably consistent RCs. 
 
In order to gain some insight into the variation in RCs over time, Table 2 presents annual 
shares and RCs for the more prominent actors from Table 1, and specifically, for those actors 
whose films accounted for more than 6.5 percent of production budgets over the sample 
period.  The table also shows, for each year, the average cost of the films in which each actor 
appeared relative to the average cost of all films produced in the given year (multiplied by 
100).  This relative average cost measure can be interpreted as an index number, so that a 
value of 150, say, would indicate that the average cost of the films in which actor i appeared 
in year t exceeded the average cost of all films produced in year t by 50 percent. 
 
From Table 2 it can be seen that Blondell, Cagney and Davis achieved high and relatively 
consistent RCs over the first half of the sample period, although there was considerable 
variation in budget shares from year to year.  O’Brien and Powell also performed strongly 
during the early to mid-thirties, while Brent and Francis exhibited considerable variation in 
annual RCs. Flynn, de Havilland and Rains were all brought in in the 1934/35 season as high 
profile stars (although at that stage they were relatively unknown), as Warners made a 
concerted move into high budget film production (the average cost of the 5 most expensive 
films in 1934/35 was $1,041,000 compared to $743,000 in the 1933/34 season). While the 
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films in which de Havilland and Rains appeared generated high RCs in this initial year, the 
performance of their films thereafter was much weaker, this being particularly so in the case 
of Rains.  By contrast Flynn exhibited consistent and strong performance even in the poor 
overall performance year of 1937/38.  Note also that in order to accommodate these three 
new stars, a number of established actors experienced sharp reductions in their budget shares 
between the 1933/34 and 1934/35 seasons, notably Blondell, Cagney, Davis, Francis and 
Powell.  
 
The relative average cost data in Table 2 offer further insights into the manner in which 
Warners deployed their actors over the period. Thus Flynn, de Havilland and Rains were 
immediately placed in high budget productions, their films being over twice as costly as the 
average in 1934/35, and in the case of Rains four times as costly.  This relative average cost 
index, therefore, can be interpreted as an index of ‘stardom’, in the sense that it reflects the 
relative level of investment that the studio was prepared to make in each actor. Interpreting 
(somewhat arbitrarily) a value for this index in the region of 200 or more as reflecting star-
level investment, Flynn, de Havilland and Rains can be seen to have been used exclusively as 
stars.  Powell could also be interpreted as a star, and certainly so from the mid-thirties.  Brent 
and Cagney experienced brief periods of stardom.  An interesting case is that of Bette Davis.  
Used in averagely costed productions for most of the sample period, productions that 
consistently generated high RCs, it was only in the late thirties that she attracted star-level 
investment. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these data, however, is how unsuccessful were the 
films in which many of these stars appeared, with the single and notable exception of Flynn.  
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Thus apart from initial success, the films of de Havilland and Rains were notably 
unsuccessful.  Once Powell began to appear in high budget productions there was a marked 
reduction in his RCs, and Davis’ films exhibited a sharp reduction in RC as the relative cost 
of these films were increased.   
 
The information in Tables 1 and 2 can be captured and summarised within a regression model 
framework. However, it is useful first to consider the institutional context within which stars 
were deployed in Hollywood in the 1930s. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
The market value of a star as a commodity is determined predominantly by the relative box-
office success of his or her previous films. Accordingly, it could be expected that the value of 
a star who had appeared in a set of films with growing net box-office returns would be rising, 
whilst that of a star whose films have performed relatively badly at the box-office would be 
in decline. The ability of a contract to reflect this value is dependent upon its term structure. 
A seven year term contract held by a studio during the classical Hollywood period would be 
re-configured to reflect the rising value of a star.9  Such a process favoured the studio, 
particularly where a significant portion of the term was still to run. A star in decline, on the 
other hand, was vulnerable to the decision not to continue with the option to retain her or his 
services.10 In contrast, the rewards of a freelance star are much more likely to reflect market 
value, since rival producers will be engaged in a bidding game to secure his or her peculiar 
qualities.  
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TABLE 2 
 
Share of Annual Production Budgets, Annual Ratio of Revenues to Production Costs and Relative Average Production 
Costs by Actor, 1931/32 to 1938/39 
 
 
 
Blondell 
 
Brent 
 
Cagney 
 
Davis 
 
de Havilland 
 
Year 
 
Share 
(%) 
 
 
RC 
 
Relative 
av cost
 
Share 
(%) 
 
 
RC 
 
Relative 
av cost
 
Share 
(%) 
 
 
RC 
 
Relative 
av cost
 
Share 
(%) 
 
 
RC 
 
Relative 
av cost
 
Share 
(%) 
 
 
RC 
 
Relative 
av cost 
1931/32
 
10.7 2.0 
 
92.8 
 
10.3 1.8 
 
89.5 
 
5.4 2.7 
 
93.4 
 
7.3 2.3 
 
95.1 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-  
1932/33
 
11.4 3.8 
 
106.9 
 
12.1 3.0 
 
112.9 
 
5.4 2.7 
 
101.3 
 
10.5 2.8 
 
98.2 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-  
1933/34
 
17.8 2.6 
 
136.8 
 
4.2 2.0 
 
76.1 
 
12.1 3.5 
 
131.0 
 
8.6 2.5 
 
77.5 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-  
1934/35
 
5.7 2.7 
 
77.2 
 
3.9 2.2 
 
70.0 
 
6.9 5.1 
 
92.6 
 
4.7 2.9 
 
84.0 
 
16.7 2.7 
 
225.5  
1935/36
 
10.2 2.1 
 
147.3 
 
4.7 1.9 
 
90.6 
 
11.7 2.1 
 
226.7 
 
8.6 2.4 
 
99.2 
 
13.1 1.9 
 
378.7  
1936/37
 
12.3 2.0 
 
178.7 
 
11.1 2.0 
 
160.4 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
4.4 3.5 
 
128.7 
 
2.9 1.0 
 
167.6  
1937/38
 
3.5 2.3 
 
98.4 
 
15.5 1.4 
 
217.2 
 
2.6 1.1 
 
143.2 
 
8.3 1.8 
 
154.7 
 
19.0 1.5 
 
265.9  
1938/39
 
3.6 1.4 
 
95.5 
 
8.7 2.0 
 
154.4 
 
9.7 2.9 
 
171.4 
 
17.3 1.8 
 
229.2 
 
10.5 2.0 
 
185.3 
 
 
 
Flynn 
 
Francis 
 
O=Brien 
 
Powell, D 
 
Rains 
 
Year 
 
Share 
(%) 
 
 
RC 
 
Relative 
av cost
 
Share 
(%) 
 
 
RC 
 
Relative 
av cost
 
Share 
(%) 
 
 
RC 
 
Relative 
av cost
 
Share 
(%) 
 
 
RC 
 
Relative 
av cost
 
Share 
(%) 
 
 
RC 
 
Relative 
av cost 
1931/32
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
5.1 1.6 
 
89.7 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-  
1932/33
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
5.7 3.2 
 
106.7 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
4.1 2.4 
 
115.9 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-  
1933/34
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
12.8 2.6 
 
138.1 
 
8.6 3.0 
 
77.4 
 
21.4 2.8 
 
192.6 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-  
1934/35
 
7.6 2.3 
 
205.4 
 
6.8 1.8 
 
122.6 
 
17.3 2.8 
 
133.2 
 
12.9 2.4 
 
174.6 
 
7.4 2.3 
 
399.1  
1935/36
 
6.8 2.5 
 
396.2 
 
7.3 2.4 
 
140.3 
 
10.9 2.4 
 
126.5 
 
19.7 1.7 
 
229.0 
 
5.2 0.7 
 
304.1  
1936/37
 
11.1 2.3 
 
214.9 
 
11.7 1.7 
 
169.7 
 
6.6 1.8 
 
127.3 
 
11.0 1.9 
 
212.0 
 
10.1 1.7 
 
195.1  
1937/38
 
11.0 2.1 
 
307.5 
 
4.7 1.3 
 
87.6 
 
11.8 1.4 
 
132.3 
 
12.2 1.3 
 
228.4 
 
16.7 1.6 
 
311.8  
1938/39
 
13.8 2.4 
 
183.3 
 
5.4 1.4 
 
71.0 
 
11.1 2.0 
 
117.7 
 
6.7 1.3 
 
118.8 
 
11.7 1.6 
 
206.7 
 
Source: William Schaefer Ledger 
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Under the circumstance that the vertically integrated majors during the classical period 
required upwards of 50 films per season during the 1930s, it is not surprising that the studios 
adopted a corporate approach to the resource co-ordinating problem: they chose to internalise 
the process through a set of term contracts, rather than acquire human resources for the 
express purpose at hand through the market. This logic is apparent in studios’ dealings with 
stars. The internal authority structure enabled studio executives to systematically plan for and 
direct the activities of those idiosyncratic assets under contract. (This often led to 
disagreements between stars and their executives concerning the appropriateness of the film 
vehicles to which the former were directed.)  It also reduced the risks associated with not 
securing the contracts of desired artistes, where substitution was problematic, since studios 
maintained what were in effect stock companies of players.  
 
In contrast, even where successful, the competitive market price necessary to secure a bundle 
of star and player inputs at any one moment, together with the additional transaction costs 
associated with constantly seeking such idiosyncratic inputs, project after project, through the 
market mechanism, imposed marked uncertainty upon the film-making process and may have 
significantly and adversely affected the box-office to production cost ratio. In effect the major 
studios in the classical period were able to expropriate a proportion of the economic rents 
generated by their stars and in so doing attenuate the risks associated with film production. 
They did this by paying them less through their term contracts than the price that would have 
been necessary to secure their services on the open market. One measure of this was the fee 
obtained from loaning out a ‘star’ to another studio which invariably resulted in wages plus a 
payment to the home studio.11 
 
 22
The foregoing discussion implies that the resource switching between actors which is 
apparent from Table 2 can be explained, at least in part, by the past financial performance of 
the films in which those actors appeared.  It would also appear that this resource switching 
was prompted by RC performance.  Sedgwick and Pokorny (1998), in examining the factors 
which influenced the annual change in the total production budget, identified rate of return 
performance as the major influence.  Thus, the proportionate change in the production budget 
from year 1-t  to t , appeared to be determined largely by the rate of return achieved on the 
production budget in 1-t .12 
 
The focus of interest here is the share of the annual production budget which is absorbed by 
the films in which actor i  appeared in year t  (in contrast to the level of the production budget 
which would be subject to a range of exogenous influences).  Specifically, an explanation is 
required, not so much for the level of this share, but for the proportionate change in this share 
from year 1-t  to year t .  Thus during 1-t , when the budgets were set for year t , three 
potential influences on this budget setting process can be considered.  First, it might be 
expected that resources would have been diverted to those actors whose films achieved high 
RCs in 1-t , and in particular, high RCs relative to the RCs of the films of other actors.   
 
Second, given RC performance, those actors who achieved more consistent performance - the 
RCs of their films exhibited relatively low variability - might have been interpreted as having 
been less risky and attracted an increasing share of resources.   
 
Finally, while the RC of an actor’s films might be interpreted as being influenced by the 
actor’s popularity, presumably there were actors whose popularity was only beginning to 
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emerge during 1-t .  However, this emerging popularity would not at that stage have been 
reflected fully in the RC in 1-t , nor indeed necessarily in the film revenues - such actors may 
only have begun to appear in relatively low budget, low revenue films.  The studio would 
have been aware of this emerging and potential popularity, from a range of informal sources, 
and therefore it would have been rational to invest in such actors immediately, rather than to 
wait until this popularity was translated ultimately into RC performance.  This argument has 
been made by Altman (1999, p. 41): 
...it is important to note that overall financial figures are not as useful to the 
Producer’s Game as initial box-office strength. Producers cannot react rapidly 
to current trends if they must wait a year for complete domestic figures or 
even longer for foreign returns. Information on initial East and West Coast 
runs thus looms much larger in production logic 
 
The influence here is expected future RCs, which in turn will be related to the extent to which 
revenues for the actor’s films were expected to increase between 1-t  and t . Therefore in 
1-t  the studio would have expected their emerging actors to generate higher (relative) box-
office in t  than in 1-t , and would have invested more in such actors.  In particular, the 
average revenue of the films in which emerging actor i  appeared in t  (relative to the average 
revenue of all films in t ) would have been expected to have exceeded the average revenue of 
the films in which s/he appeared in 1-t  (relative to the average revenue of all films in 1-t ).  
Therefore a direct measure of this expectation would be the actual proportionate increase in 
actor i’s relative average film revenues between 1-t  and t .  Strictly, this is an ex post 
expectations measure and can be interpreted, informally, as a rational expectations measure.  
However, it is clearly an imperfect measure, there being a tendency for its statistical 
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significance to be overstated.  Nonetheless it is the best measure available, given that such an 
influence on the investment decision was a relevant one, and must necessarily have been 
forward-looking rather than backward-looking.13 
 
In terms of a regression model framework, the dependent variable is the proportionate change 
in the share of the annual production budgets of the films in which actor i  appeared between 
1-t  and t .  Measuring this change as the change in the natural logarithm of the shares, this 
variable is denoted by itSHARElnΔ .  In terms of the independent variables, relative RC 
performance is measured as the ratio of the RC achieved by all the films in which actor i  
appeared in 1-t  to the RC achieved by the total production budget in 1-t .  Denote this 
variable by )1( −tiRELRC .  The relative risk associated with actor i  is measured as the ratio of 
the coefficient of variation of the RCs of the films in which actor i  appeared in 1-t  to the 
coefficient of variation of the RCs of all films in 1-t .14  Denote this variable by 
)1( −tiRELRISK .  Finally, the emerging relative popularity of actor i  is measured as the change 
in the natural logarithm of the relative average revenue of the films in which actor i  appears 
between 1-t  and t .  Denote this variable by itRELPOP .   
 
Equation 4 in Table 3 presents the regression results, and it can be seen that all coefficient 
signs are as expected, and all coefficients are significant. Note that the 175 observations in 
Equation 4 refer to the annual actor budget share changes for which a full set of sample 
observations was available.   
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This regression equation should be interpreted with some care.  It certainly does not purport 
to provide a full explanation of the determinants of budget share allocations. This is borne out 
by the relatively low 2R  statistic. Undoubtedly there was a range of subjective and 
speculative considerations that influenced such allocations, which in a sense were inherently 
unpredictable, given the constant pressure to innovate and stimulate ‘surprises’ in audiences.   
Rather, what the regression implies is that Warners made such decisions against a 
background in which clear reference to past financial success was made, in which there was 
an element of risk aversion (the negative coefficient on )1( −tiRELRISK ), but also mindful of 
future opportunities: it describes a context within which the studio managed its set of star 
assets.  
 
For instance, at some point in the 1937/38 season Table 2 suggests that the studio’s 
management, in doubling the proportion of the global film-making budget allocated to the 
films in which Bette Davis appeared, decided to bet heavily in elevating her to principal star 
status: as a star capable of carrying super ‘A’ productions. No doubt the build up in RC 
performances in the preceding years helped the studio to this decision.  Further, although her 
films appeared to have performed poorly during the 1937/8 season this should be read in the 
context of the fall in demand for films in general during that year15 and that when compared 
to the RCs of other stars during that year - a factor integral to Equation 4 in Table 3 - her 
performance suggests that indeed her popularity held up.  
 
 
THE ALLOCATION OF ANNUAL FILM BUDGETS BY DIRECTOR AND GENRE 
 
A similar analysis to that presented above for actors in Tables 1 and 2 was also performed for 
directors and genres, although a detailed discussion of these analyses will not be presented 
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here. Equation 5 in Table 3 presents the equation analogous to Equation 4, where budget 
shares now refer to the share of production budgets allocated to directors.  Thus all 
coefficients are of the expected signs and are significant.  Again, these regressions provide 
clear evidence of reference having been made to past financial success in allocating 
production budgets across directors, although such an explanation is necessarily a partial one, 
and a weaker one than in the case of explaining actor budget shares, given the relatively low 
2R  statistic.  It would appear that in deciding upon which film properties directors were 
allocated in any single season, cognisance of the returns to their films, the variability of those 
returns, and the growth in their popularity, all relative to the season’s average, were important 
factors for the studio’s executives. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Regressions for the Annual Proportionate Change in Production 
Budget Shares Allocated to Actors, Directors and Genres 
 
Equation 4 
 
ACTORS 
 
Equation 5 
 
DIRECTORS 
 
Equation 6 
 
GENRES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
 
itSHARElnΔ  
 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
 
itSHARElnΔ  
 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
 
itSHARElnΔ  
 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
 
      CONSTANT  
 
        -0.889*** 
        (0.208) 
 
-0.832*** 
        (0.281) 
 
        -0.302 
        (0.403) 
 
      )1( −tiRELRC  
 
  0.823*** 
        (0.175) 
 
 0.886*** 
        (0.249) 
 
  0.904*** 
        (0.284) 
 
      )1( −tiRELRISK  
 
        -0.279** 
        (0.117) 
 
        -0.275* 
        (0.149) 
 
-0.793*** 
        (0.251) 
 
      itRELPOP  
 
  0.881*** 
        (0.092) 
 
  0.878*** 
        (0.165) 
 
0.618*** 
        (0.160) 
 
2R  
 
0.403 
 
0.298 
 
0.507 
 
n 
 
175 
 
87 
 
38 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
*     Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
Genre composition forms the final aspect of this investigation into the influences on the 
portfolio composition of film products at Warners. In his account of Hollywood’s 
commercial development, John Izod explains that genre classifications perform the essential 
task of codifying the film product, enabling audiences to form expectations easily, and 
understand the experience of cinemagoing. For Izod (1988, p. 56) genre enables ‘the 
uniqueness of the product to be strikingly de-emphasised.’ However, in contrast to the 
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objective nature in which actors and directors can be identified, defining the genre of any 
given film necessarily involves elements of arbitrariness and subjectivity. 
 
For the purposes of this investigation a genre classification is required which produces genre 
categories with sufficient observations for valid statistical analysis.  An initial genre 
categorisation of the 441 films that Warners produced during the period produced 27 genre 
categories.  These 27 categories were aggregated into just 7 categories, the core categories 
being  ‘drama’, ‘comedy’, ‘crime’, and ‘musical’. Those films ‘with songs’ (such as ‘drama 
with songs’, ‘comedy with songs’) were classified into a separate category (films with songs). 
The remaining films (of which there were just 50) were divided into two further categories.  
The first was defined as ‘prestige’ films.  These films, in one-off genre categories, were for 
the most part designed to be the ‘hits’ of the season and were intended to be attractive to both 
the exhibition wings of rival companies as well as independent cinema owners.16 These films 
had relatively high budgets, were innovative in nature, and were promotional vehicles for the 
studio’s popular stars of the time. The final category of films was simply classified as 
‘miscellaneous’.17 
 
Equation 6 in Table 3 presents the results of the genre budget share regression.  Thus the 
dependent variable would now reflect the annual proportionate change in production budget 
shares allocated to each genre. Again, all coefficients are of the expected sign and significant.  
 
While the results in Equation 6 provide evidence of annual genre composition evolving in 
response to a set of financial factors, the static nature of the genre composition used must be 
recognised.  Thus Equation 6 cannot explain the emergence of new genres or the extent to 
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which Warners anticipated changing consumer tastes.  In part, such innovation is reflected in 
the ‘prestige’ category, and the performance of this category can be interpreted as indicating 
how successful such innovation was, but without explaining what motivated it.   
  
 
STARDOM AND FILM PROFITABILITY 
 
Given the extent to which Warners invested in previously successful actors, the central issue 
is how profitable such a strategy proved to be.  This issue can be examined by assessing the 
extent to which the profitability of a film, as reflected in its RC value, can be explained 
directly in terms of the past success of the actors who appeared in the film, while 
standardising for a range of other factors that may have impacted upon film profitability.   
 
The discussion of the previous sections would imply that Warners expected film profitability 
to have been related positively to the previous RCs generated by the film’s stars, director and 
genre.  Similarly, the use of emerging stars, directors and genres should also have contributed 
positively to profitability.  The impact of risk is perhaps not so clear-cut.  While it may have 
been the case that Warners were reluctant to invest in high risk stars, directors and genres, cet 
par, this is not to suggest that there may not have been some return to risk taking.   
 
Thus consider a regression equation which explains the variation in the RCs of the films in 
the sample.  The previous success of the director of film i in year t can be measured by the 
aggregate RC of all the films which the director directed in year 1-t .  Therefore, for all films 
in the sample a variable was constructed which measured the RC achieved by the director’s 
films in the previous year.  Denote this variable by )1( −tiDIRRC .  Similarly, for genre, a 
 30
variable was constructed which measured the RC achieved by the genre’s films in the 
previous year. Denote this variable by )1( −tiGENRC .  Finally, the potential contribution of the 
actors in the film can be measured by the RCs that their films achieved in the previous year.  
Now as a given film can have up to four (or even more) main stars an issue arises as to how, 
in aggregate, the previous success of the film’s stars is to be measured.  The approach taken 
here is to assume that it was only the first two named stars of any given film that provided the 
focus for consumer interest. Therefore the previous success of the stars of a given film was 
measured as the average of the aggregate RC achieved by the films of the two main stars in 
the previous season.18  This variable is denoted by )1( −tiSTARRC .   
 
The emerging popularity of a film’s stars, director and genre were measured in an analogous 
manner to the popularity measures derived in the previous sections, although for present 
purposes absolute rather than relative measures are appropriate.  Thus the popularity of the 
director of film i in year t is measured as the proportionate increase in the average revenue of 
the director’s films between 1-t  and t.  Denote this variable by itDIRPOP .  Similarly, the 
emerging popularity of the film’s genre is measured as the proportionate increase in the 
average revenue of the genre’s films between 1-t  and t, and is denoted by itGENRPOP .  In 
the case of the emerging popularity of the film’s stars again only the first two named stars are 
considered.  The variable is measured as the average of the proportionate increase in the 
average revenues of each of the two star’s films between 1-t  and t, and is denoted by 
itSTARPOP .  In all cases these popularity variables are measured in constant prices and in 
differenced logarithm form. 
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Finally, the risk associated with a film’s stars, director and genre in year t is measured by the 
coefficient of variation of the respective RCs in 1-t .  In the case of the film’s stars this is 
measured as the average of the coefficients of variation achieved by the first two named stars.  
These variables are denoted, respectively, as )1( −tiSTARRISK , )1( −tiDIRRISK , and 
)1( −tiGENRRISK . 
 
In terms of the dependent variable, the natural logarithm of RC is used, given the inherent 
non-linearity in RC as reflected in Figure 2.  Using the logarithm also has the added 
advantage of adjusting for the mild skewness in the RC values, thereby producing normally 
distributed regression residuals. 
 
Equation 7 in Table 4 presents the basic regression model for the 225 films in the sample for 
which a full set of observations was available.19  The significance of the regression 
coefficients are evaluated within the context of White’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard 
errors, the presence heteroscedastic disturbances having been indicated in the simple OLS 
estimate of the model.20   Thus film (LOG) RCs were influenced positively through the use of 
previously high RC performing actors and directors, and through the use of emerging actors, 
directors and genres.  Risk taking did not appear to exert a significant influence on film RC 
performance.   
 
In order to evaluate the robustness of these results Equation 8 in Table 4 includes four control 
variables. The first is the production cost of film i in year t (in 1929 prices), and is included to 
standardise for the tendency for low budget films to generate relatively high rates of return, 
cet par, alluded to in the discussion of Figure 2 above.  Given the non-linear relationship 
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between film RCs and production costs apparent from Figure 2 this variable is included in 
logarithmic form, and is denoted by itLOGCOST .  The second control variable is the rating 
allocated to film i in year t, by the Motion Picture Guide.21 All films have been rated on a 6 
point scale (0 to 5 - 0 signifying ‘not worth a glance’ and 5 ‘a masterpiece’), in increments of 
0.5.  These ratings purport to provide an objective assessment of the artistic worth of the film, 
in terms of the quality of the acting, direction, script and technical achievement. The variable 
can be interpreted as capturing the complex interactions between the various inputs into film 
production, and its inclusion allows for the evaluation of the marginal impacts of some of the 
specific inputs (star, director, genre), over and above their composite impact. This variable is 
denoted by itRATING .
22 
 
The final two control variables are included to capture the time-series dimension of the data 
set.  The first is an index of Real Personal Disposable Income, for each year, and is included 
to account for the exogenous economic influences on film RCs. This variable is denoted by 
itPDI .  The final variable is a simple time trend variable, included to capture any secular 
trend in film RCs.  This variable is denoted by itTREND .   
 
Thus all the control variables included in Equation 8 are significant, with expected signs in 
the cases of itLOGCOST , itRATING  and itPDI .  The negative coefficient on itTREND  
implies a secular decline in film RCs, which might be explained in terms of the increasingly 
competitive film production environment that evolved during the 1930s.  In terms of the 
original variables from Equation 7, previous actor RC performance remains significant, but 
director RC performance is now insignificant.  Equation 8 now also implies that there may 
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have been some return to use of risky directors, but that the use of risky actors may have 
mildly inhibited RC performance. 
 
While these results are of some interest, the highly aggregated nature of the regressions - 
aggregated over all films and time periods - may have aggregated out a number of underlying 
influences.  One possibility is that there were differential impacts according to the budget 
category of the film, in the sense, for example, that the production of high budget films 
demanded a very different strategic approach to that of low budget films.   
 
In order to examine this issue the films in the sample were allocated to one of three budget 
categories - high budget, medium budget and low budget.  These three categories could be 
interpreted broadly as ‘super A’, ‘A’ and ‘B’ movies. In order to allocate a film to one of 
these categories it did not seem appropriate to use some absolute cost criterion as a basis for 
doing so - the cost of a high budget film in the early 1930s was presumably very different 
from the cost of a high budget film in the late 1930s. The approach taken was to define the 
budgetary category of a given film on the basis of the relative average cost measure used in 
Table 2. That is, in any given year the cost of film i was expressed relative to the average cost 
of all films produced in that year (and multiplied by 100). This relative average cost index 
was then used to allocate films to a budget category.  Specifically, high budget films were 
defined as those films for which the value of this index was 150 or more – that is, high budget 
films (in year t) were defined as films whose production costs exceeded average production 
costs (in year t) by 50 percent or more.  Medium budget films were those films with a relative 
average cost index lying between 75 and 150.  Low budget films were defined as those films 
with a relative average cost index of less than 75.  While there is an element of arbitrariness 
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in such a partition – and in part its definition was conditioned by sample size requirements 
within each category, particularly the high-budget category – it at least provides some basis 
for disaggregating by budgetary category.23 
 
Table 5 presents the profitability regressions for the high budget films, and Table 6 presents 
the results for the combination of all the medium and low budget films.24 The most obvious 
feature of the regressions in Table 5 is how little explanatory power they produce. In 
particular, there is no evidence of any returns to the employment of successful or emerging 
actors.  A further variable is added to these regressions which attempts to capture the possible 
interaction between actors and directors, and is simply the product of the )1( −tiSTARRC  and 
)1( −tiDIRRC variables.  This variable is denoted by )1( −tiINTSTARDIR .  The variable appears as 
weakly significant only in Equation 12, and note from Equation 12 that the employment of 
previously successful actors now has a weakly significant and negative impact on film RC.  
From Table 5 there is some evidence of returns to the use of risky directors and genres, but 
this hardly amounts to a well-defined strategy, and is presumably more a reflection of the 
uncertainty and risks inherent is high budget production. Presumably, the production of 
successful high budget films was more complex than such a relatively simple strategy would 
imply, or that the process was simply dominated by uncertainty, and not susceptible to 
effective risk-minimising strategies.  Such a conclusion is also consistent with the results in 
Table 2, which emphasised the poor rate of return performance of high profile actors. 
 
By contrast, the regressions in Table 6 produce much more coherent results.  There were 
clear returns to the use of high rate of return actors and directors, and popular actors, directors 
and genres.  There were some differences between the production of medium and low budget 
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films.  Thus the use of previously successful directors was only significant in the production 
of medium budget films.  The use of risky stars had a negative impact on the production of 
low budget films, and the use of risky genres had a negative impact on the production of 
medium budget films. 
 
Thus, the results in Tables 5 and 6 can now be used to interpret the aggregate results in Table 
4.  It is clear that the results in Table 4 are dominated by the medium and low budget films.  
The high budget regressions in Table 5 reflect the volatile nature of high budget production.  
There did not appear to be an obvious, or consistent, strategy available for producing 
profitable high budget films, save that there appear to have been some returns to risk taking.  
This does not define a strategy as such, but rather was an ex post outcome of what was 
presumably a series of ‘hit or miss’ strategies that the use of unpredictable directors and 
genres entailed.  The negligible impact that the use of high rate of return stars had is probably 
to be explained by the high costs of using such stars, and therefore the high profitability that 
such films required in order to cover these costs, profitability levels which in general were 
presumably not attained.  The medium and low budget regressions in Table 6, on the other 
hand, reflect a much more ordered and predictable film production environment.  There were 
clear returns to using successful and potentially successful stars, directors and genres, there 
being disincentive to engage in risk taking strategies with regard to the deployment of actors 
and directors. 
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TABLE 4 
Regressions for Film LOG RCs 
All Films 
 
 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
                         
Equation 7 
Coefficient 
(White’s Adjusted 
Standard Error) 
 
Equation 8 
Coefficient 
(White’s Adjusted 
Standard Error) 
 
CONSTANT  
 
        467.300*** 
        (15.542) 
 
        533.560*** 
        (40.725) 
 
STARRC )-i(t 1  
 
     0.142*** 
           (0.040) 
 
            0.087** 
           (0.035) 
 
DIRRC )-i(t 1  
 
     0.124*** 
           (0.045) 
 
            0.065 
           (0.041) 
 
GENRRC )-i(t 1  
 
0.034 
           (0.062) 
 
            0.050 
           (0.050) 
 
STARPOPit  
 
   23.227*** 
          (5.917) 
 
          21.689*** 
          (5.097) 
 
DIRPOPit  
 
   17.489*** 
(4.836) 
 
          14.542*** 
          (4.349) 
 
GENRPOPit  
 
 18.134** 
(7.456) 
 
          15.514** 
          (6.878) 
 
STARRISK )-i(t 1  
 
-0.167 
(0.127) 
 
          -0.193* 
          (0.167) 
 
DIRRISK )-i(t 1  
 
 0.081 
(0.138) 
 
           0.311*** 
          (0.120) 
 
 GENRRISK )-i(t 1  
 
 0.038 
  (0.174) 
 
          -0.016 
          (0.162) 
 
 itLOGCOST  
 
 
 
 
         -29.781*** 
          (4.032) 
 
 RATINGit  
 
  
 
          17.429*** 
                (2.711) 
 
 itPDI  
 
 
 
 
            1.274** 
           (0.520) 
 
 itTREND  
 
 
 
 
           -7.042** 
           (3.090) 
 
R2  
 
0.260 
 
0.482 
 
n 
 
225 
 
225 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level,  
* Significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 5 
Regressions for Film LOG RCs 
High Budget Films 
 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
                         
Equation 9 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
 
Equation 10 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
 
Equation 11 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
 
Equation 12 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
 
CONSTANT  
 
        397.000*** 
        (32.266) 
 
  503.940*** 
       (118.420) 
 
        427.330* 
       (235.270) 
 
         471.530** 
        (226.860) 
 
STARRC )-i(t 1  
 
0.101 
           (0.090) 
 
 -0.221 
(0.355)     
 
            0.000 
           (0.094) 
 
          -0.664* 
          (0.369)    
 
DIRRC )-i(t 1  
 
0.167 
           (0.155) 
 
 -0.231 
           (0.451) 
 
            0.141 
           (0.151) 
 
          -0.666 
          (0.458) 
 
INTSTARDIR )-i(t 1
 
 
 
 
  1.399 
  (1.490) 
 
           
 
           2.795* 
          (1.505) 
 
GENRRC )-i(t 1  
 
0.014 
           (0.100) 
 
 0.027 
 (0.109) 
 
            0.018 
           (0.094) 
 
          -0.056 
          (0.099) 
 
STARPOPit  
 
          21.805 
         (15.897) 
 
23.453 
(16.023) 
 
          12.328 
         (15.745) 
 
         16.612 
        (15.273) 
 
DIRPOPit  
 
          19.947 
(15.893) 
 
20.250 
(15.926) 
 
          18.396 
         (16.675) 
 
         14.817 
        (16.105) 
 
GENRPOPit  
 
29.743* 
(17.068) 
 
           26.916 
(17.363) 
 
          21.379 
         (17.497) 
 
         19.137 
        (16.822) 
 
STARRISK )-i(t 1  
 
-0.272 
(0.495) 
 
           -0.280 
           (0.496) 
 
           -0.255 
          (0.480) 
 
          -0.336 
         (0.463) 
 
DIRRISK )-i(t 1  
 
 0.602 
(0.361) 
 
            0.601 
           (0.362) 
 
           0.683* 
          (0.351) 
 
           0.748** 
          (0.338) 
 
 GENRRISK )-i(t 1  
 
   1.310** 
  (0.601) 
 
            1.028 
           (0.673) 
 
           1.275* 
          (0.656) 
 
           0.975 
         (0.650) 
 
 itLOGCOST  
 
 
 
 
 
 
        -24.120 
        (26.466) 
 
        -12.994 
        (26.076) 
 
 RATINGit  
 
  
 
         
 
         17.548** 
              (6.811) 
  
          17.341** 
          (6.532) 
 
 itPDI  
 
  
 
         
 
           1.716 
               (1.647) 
  
            3.254* 
          (1.783) 
 
 itTREND  
 
 
 
 
 
 
          -9.762 
        (11.686) 
 
         -19.640 
         (12.404) 
 
R2  
 
0.484 
 
0.499 
 
0.607 
 
0.651 
 
n 
 
42 
 
42 
 
42 
 
42 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 6 
Regressions for Film LOG RCs 
Medium and Low Budget Films 
 
 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
                         
Equation 13 
Coefficient 
(White’s Adjusted 
Standard Error) 
 
Equation 14 
Coefficient 
(White’s Adjusted 
Standard Error) 
 
CONSTANT  
 
        464.820*** 
        (14.722) 
 
        503.050*** 
        (47.466) 
 
STARRC )-i(t 1  
 
    0.145*** 
          (0.038) 
 
            0.116*** 
           (0.034) 
 
DIRRC )-i(t 1  
 
    0.129*** 
          (0.044) 
 
            0.077* 
           (0.043) 
 
GENRRC )-i(t 1  
 
     0.120*** 
           (0.039) 
 
            0.080 
           (0.052) 
 
STARPOPit  
 
   23.586*** 
          (5.442) 
 
          24.615*** 
          (5.384) 
 
DIRPOPit  
 
   20.128*** 
(4.501) 
 
          14.887*** 
          (4.179) 
 
GENRPOPit  
 
 14.635** 
          (6.580) 
 
          15.108** 
          (6.176) 
 
STARRISK )-i(t 1  
 
          -0.141 
          (0.132) 
 
          -0.194 
          (0.118) 
 
DIRRISK )-i(t 1  
 
           0.003 
          (0.138) 
 
           0.240* 
          (0.128) 
 
 GENRRISK )-i(t 1  
 
          -0.412** 
          (0.175) 
 
          -0.380** 
          (0.165) 
 
 itLOGCOST  
 
 
 
 
         -26.940*** 
          (4.953) 
 
 RATINGit  
 
  
 
          15.384*** 
                (3.133) 
 
 itPDI  
 
  
 
            1.596** 
                (0.617) 
 
 itTREND  
 
 
 
 
           -9.533*** 
           (3.580) 
 
R2  
 
0.334 
 
0.506 
 
n 
 
183 
 
183 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level,  
* Significant at the 10% level 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper examines Warner Bros.’ approach to film production during the 1930s from a 
strategic perspective, and places an emphasis on financial rather than artistic strategies.  As 
such it only purports to provide a partial analysis of the film production process, and can 
perhaps best be interpreted as providing an analysis of the financial context within which the 
more intractable artistic decisions had to be to taken. 
 
Evidence is presented of Warners adopting an incremental approach to the development of 
their film portfolios, building on the success of their actors, directors and genres, with such an 
approach appearing to have a positive impact on film RC performance.  
 
However, when a distinction is drawn between high budget and medium/low budget film 
production, these positive effects that could be attributed to the exploitation of stardom were 
seen to have been derived exclusively from the production of medium/low budget films.  In 
particular, the use of stars did not appear to have been an effective strategy in the production 
of high budget films. In part, this could be explained by the fact that the production of high 
budget films was necessarily risky and represented a major focus for innovation.  Thus some 
evidence is presented of returns to risk taking behaviour in the production of high budget 
films, but of negligible returns to an incremental approach.  Perhaps this is to be expected, 
given the one-off nature of much high budget production - the production of a high budget 
‘hit’ is a complex process and the relatively simple strategy of using high profile stars to 
carry such productions is unlikely to have been successful of itself.  In addition, Warners’ 
expertise lay in the production of medium to high/medium budget films. 
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The conclusion which emerges is that the financial data on the performance of films produced 
by Warners during the 1930s indicate that studio investment in ‘stars’ and ‘big budget’ 
vehicles in which they appeared is not explained by standard investment criteria: the 
additional expenditure on star qualities and expenditures associated with ‘big budget’ films 
did not consistently generate sufficient box-office revenues to justify this investment.  
Accordingly, the production of big budget productions should be seen not as a business 
decision governed by a calculus based upon a probability distribution of risks, but rather as 
stand alone investments, akin to product innovation, in which the producer’s imagination is 
paramount.  Nevertheless, and this is critical, such investments were made in a context of a 
portfolio of film products which in effect cushioned the gamble in this type of film. 
 
Finally, to focus on particular stars and to evaluate their contribution to the profitability of 
specific films may be potentially misleading.  The analysis here has demonstrated that there 
are clear returns to the use of previously successful actors, and particularly so in the 
production of medium/low budget films.  That such a strategy must necessarily produce 
‘stars’ is self-evident.  However to observe that some well-established stars did not have a 
significant impact on the financial success of the films in which they appear is not necessarily 
a rejection of value of stardom.  Rather it may reflect the natural cyclical nature of stardom, 
in that it is inevitable that stars lose their star power, and therefore at some point cease to 
produce value added. Additionally, film production must also be seen within its institutional 
context, in the sense that any film is but a component of a portfolio of films. It is the manner 
in which risk is spread across this portfolio that is of relevance, and in turn, how the 
deployment of actors, amongst a range of strategies, can be used to attenuate this risk.  
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Notes 
 
 
                                                 
1   Variety publishes data relating to the top 60 grossing films on a week by week basis, data 
that is collected and supplied by A C Nielsen/Entertainment Data International. These data 
also appear in a variety of other published sources, electronic and otherwise. 
 
2   A C Nielson/EDI. 
 
3   See Bart (1999) for a well known film analyst’s conception and description of the risk 
environment facing production companies. 
 
4    This process was accentuated as a consequence of the dramatic decline in real box-office 
revenues between 1946 and 1963, encouraging studios to off-load their stars in an effort to 
cut back on overhead costs. The widespread adoption of the net profit contract can be viewed 
as a means of transferring risk from the production company to the star. See Weinstein 
(1998), and Acheson, K., and Maule, C. (1994). 
 
5     The data set is derived from the recently discovered William Schaefer ledger of 
production costs and box-office returns of feature films released by Warners between 1922 
and 1951.  The authors are grateful to Mark Glancy for access to the complete Schaefer 
ledger. 
 
6   We are grateful to Richard Jewell (RKO data) and Mark Glancy (MGM data) for kindly 
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making these data sets available to us - see Jewell (1994) and Glancy (1992). 
 
7   See King (1986). 
 
8   This can be justified in terms of identifying those actors whose performances were of 
overall importance to the studio. However, the string of actors who appeared in each of the 
441 films released during the period, have not been weighted according to their billing status. 
 
9  Weinstein (1998) confirms the generality of such contracts during the studio period. For a 
general discussion of stardom during these years, see Sedgwick (2000: ch.9). Balio (1995: 
155-161) gives an account of the typical life cycle of stars and details James Cagney’s and 
Bette Davis’ respective disputes with Warners during the mid-1930s. Also see Klein and 
Leffler (1981) on the economics of breaking contracts. 
 
10   Where the star was on ‘picture-deal’ terms the studio would cast the star in low-budget 
productions to encourage the star’s agent to negotiate ‘buying out’ the contract eg Joan 
Crawford paid $200,000 in 1952 to be released from her contract with Warners. Where the 
contract had clauses giving the star approval of script and/or director and/or co-star and/or 
cinematographer and/or working conditions, the studio simply produced a flow of proposals 
that would be unacceptable to the star in the hope of forcing a buy-out (see Shipman (1989, 
pp. 130-136).  
 
11    See Sedgwick, op cit, for a discussion of loan outs.  See also Balio (1995: 155-166) for a 
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discussion of the life cycle of stars. 
 
12    See Equation (6) in Sedgwick and Pokorny (1998).  
 
13   This variable is imperfect as a strict and independent measure of expectations.  To the 
extent to which box-office revenues increase with production budgets (albeit in a highly 
heteroscedastic manner), the share of production budgets allocated to actor i will tend to 
increase if the actor appears in higher budget films in period t , as compared to 1-t , cet par. 
This in turn will tend to produce higher average revenues in t . Thus the significance of this 
variable will tend to be overstated. 
 
14   Throughout risk is measured in terms of the coefficient of variation rather than the 
standard deviation, on the assumption that it is a relative measure rather than an absolute 
measure that is appropriate.  However, using the standard deviation results in only marginal 
and generally insignificant changes. 
  
15   Annual cinema admissions fell from 4,576 million in 1936 and 1937 to 4,420 million in 
1938 in response to a fall in real personal disposable income in the US from $84.9 to $79.6 
billion between 1937 and 1938 (Historical Statistics of the US. (1975), found in Table 1 in 
Sedgwick and Pokorny (1998). The decline in profitability was marked since the studio had 
substantially increased the average budgets of its films. 
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16   A few films, such as A Midsumer Night’s Dream (1935), and the all black musical, The 
Green Pastures (1936), appear to have been made primarily to boost the cultural kudos and 
‘respectability’ of the studio. 
 
17   These films were for the greater part B features that were intended to play a supporting 
role to main features on cinema programmes. 
 
18  There were a number of films in which observations were unavailable on either the first or 
second star, as a result of either star not having appeared in any films in the previous season.  
In such cases the observation on the single star was used.  There were 90 films (out of the 225 
for which a full set of observations was available – see Endnote 19) which contained a 
‘missing’ observation for either the first or second named actor – 23 missing observations on 
the first named actor and 67 on the second named actor.  There were a variety of reasons for 
the non-appearance of actors in the previous season.  In some cases films included actors who 
only ever appeared in 1 or 2 films over the sample period.  Some of these would have been 
loaned out by rival studios.  New actors by definition would not have appeared previously, 
and these were a mixture of genuinely unknown actors, and well-known actors transferring 
from other studios.  In a small number of cases actors skipped a season. There were a small 
number of films in which only one actor was recorded in the original ledgers.  Using just the 
RC value of the just first named actor, resulted in no substantive changes to the regression 
results, although resulted in a lost of 23 observations.  Imputing a zero value for missing 
observations resulting from the use of unknown actors again produced no substantive changes 
in the regression results.  The same approach was used for the popularity and risk variables. 
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19    Due to the one-year lag in the regressions all observations for the first year of the sample 
period – 1931/2 – were lost.  Observations were also lost for films in which the first and 
second named actor did not appear in the previous season, or the film’s director did not direct 
a film in the previous season, or the film’s genre did not occur in the previous season.  
Observations were also lost for actors, directors and genres who did not generate multiple 
observations in the previous year to enable the calculation of coefficients of variation.  
 
20   According to the Breusch-Pagan (Koenker adjusted) test.  The regression disturbances 
were normal according to the Bera/Jarque test, and all subsequent regressions also satisfied 
this test. 
 
21  See Nash and Ross (Eds) (1985). 
 
22   Like Hamlen (1991, 1994) we use an external quality measure. Unlike him, our quality 
variable represents the finished product (in our case the film) whilst his is a measure of the 
quality of the input (in his case the quality of the voice). Whereas Hamlen is concerned to 
investigate whether popular music singers conform to Rosen’s conception of superstardom, 
where the more talented will take a larger share of the market over time, our investigation is 
focused on the contribution made by the star to the returns generated by the film outputs of 
the studio. 
 
23   A number of alternative partitions were used. For example, the high budget films in each 
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year were also defined as the 20% most expensive films in the year, medium budget as the 
next 40% most expensive films, and low budget as the remaining 40% of films.  Marginal 
changes to the relative average cost index cut off points were also experimented with.  These 
different partitions did not produce significant changes in the statistical results that follow. 
 
24   The high budget regressions did not indicate the presence of heteroscedastic disturbances, 
and so conventionally calculated standard errors are quoted.  Re-estimating the equations 
using White’s adjusted standard errors produced similar results. 
